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The completion of twenty years of fruitful and important service
on the Supreme Court is happily and fitly honored by the dedication
of an issue of the Yale Law Journal to Mr. Justice Brennan. Why it is
especially fitting that a number devoted to federalism should be the
vehicle for this tribute may not be so obvious. For Justice Brennan
has been the most persistent, unwavering voice in support of a
judicial review most tolerant of the range of national powers and
most intensive in the application of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
to state (no less than to national) authority.
Justice Brennan himself has not ignored the relevance of our federal
structure to the issue of judicial review of state action. For him the
proper judicial response turns on the purposes, not the forms, of a
federal system, and among those purposes he would give first rank to
the protection of individuals against arbitrary domination by the
concentrated power of officialdom. "Federalism," he has recently re-
minded us, "need not be a mean-spirited doctrine that serves only to
limit the scope of human liberty."' Federalism and judicial review
were designed, after all, as twin safeguards against oppressive power.
And judicial review itself, operating as it does on both the state and
national levels, under two sets of constitutional standards, can furnish
a double security. Such, at any rate, is clearly the philosophy of Justice
Brennan: "[O]ne of the strengths of our federal system is that it
provides a double source of protection for the rights of our citizens.
Federalism is not served when the federal half of that protection is
crippled." 2
t Carl M. Loeb University Professor Emeritus, Harvard University.
1. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Hagv. L.
REv. 489, 503 (1977).
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In thus identifying federalism not as something to be cherished for
the sake of its form but as an instrumental measure for the securing
of freedom, Justice Brennan is allied with federalism's most ardent
encomiasts. "No domain of continental extent," Dean Roscoe Pound
wrote, "has been ruled otherwise than as an autocracy or as a federal
state."3 Lord Acton's praise was especially fulsome: "By multiplying
centres of government and discussion it promotes the diffusion of
political knowledge and the maintenance of healthy and independent
opinion. It is the protectorate of minorities, and the consecration of
self-government.
' 4
Matched against the actual performance of certain state and local
governments, this tribute to federalism may seem romantic or even
ironic. That is why a Bill of Rights is a natural corollary, not an
antagonist, of the federal system. It is not a mere striking coincidence
that the specific values enumerated by Lord Acton are the very ones
that Justice Brennan has striven to fortify through judicial review:
freedom of thought and expression; diffusion of political participation;
protection of minorities. These are not only the common values of
federalism and guaranteed rights; these are also the values whose safe-
guarding is most appropriate for the judicial function in a democracy.
They are at the heart of the structure and process which must be relied
on, and therefore kept open and unobstructed, if the political deci-
sions made through the system are to deserve and receive respect.
As Justice Brennan is a realist in his perception of federalism, so he
recognizes that the majestic standards of the Bill of Rights require for
their translation into action a set of middle-level principles responsive
to the various contexts of experience. In this work of judicial transla-
tion he has been exceptionally resourceful in fashioning justice with
the armament of procedure. Thus in giving the press a margin of
error, or breathing space, in the area of political defamation, he
resisted the allure of an absolute privilege and instead adopted a
standard of proof that would not wholly close the door to redress yet
would prevent all but the most flagrant cases from going to trial or at
least from going to the jury.5
This mode of thought, apprehending substantive rights in terms of
procedural variants, is perhaps a product of his experience as a trial
lawyer and state court judge. Perhaps it is an appreciation of the value
3. round, Law and Federal Government, in FEDERALISM AS A DEMoCRATIc PROCESS 3, 23
(1942).
4. J. ACrON, The History of Freedom in Antiquity, in THE HIsToRY OF FREEDOM AND
OTHER ESSAYS 1, 20-21 (J. Figgis & R. Laurence eds. 1919).
5. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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of accommodation, whether among rights or among judges who must
assess them. Whatever the derivation, this resourceful employment of
procedural options has been a notable characteristic of Justice Bren-
nan's judicial method. In one of his early opinions on the Supreme
Court he voiced this dominant theme:
To experienced lawyers it is commonplace that the outcome of
a lawsuit-and hence the vindication of legal rights-depends more
often on how the factfinder appraises the facts than on a disputed
construction of a statute or interpretation of a line of precedents.
Thus the procedures by which the facts of the case are determined
assume an importance fully as great as the validity of the substan-
tive rule of law to be applied. And the more important the rights
at stake the more important must be the procedural safeguards
surrounding those rights.6
In that case, speaking for the Court, he rejected a procedure that
would have put on a state taxpayer the burden of proving the truth
of an affidavit of loyalty. Fifteen years later, again for the Court, he
approached a thorny issue by way of presumptions, this time raising a
rebuttable presumption, where there was shown to be purposeful racial
discrimination in a part of a school district, that racial imbalance in
the remainder of the district was attributable to the same cause.7
Procedural though they are, these are powerful levers in the enforce-
ment of constitutional guarantees.
Justice Brennan's resourcefulness springs in the end not only, per-
haps not so much, from the skill of a craftsman as from the passion of
a committed believer-from that passion combined with high moral
courage, shown not least in his unflinching protection of politically
odious speech and his rigorous insistence on the separation of church
and state in the face of the short-term seductiveness of public financial
support. His vision, resourcefulness, passion, and courage have made
him a redoubtable champion of a free, open, and just society.
6. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1958).
7. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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